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FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS. By 
Sidney Fine.' Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
1984. Pp. ix, 784. $35.00. 
Michael E. Parrish 2 
While they sat on the bench together listening to oral argu-
ments during the 1944 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 
Felix Frankfurter scribbled a note to Frank Murphy which listed 
the latter's "clients": 
"Reds" 
Whores 
Crooks 
Indians and all other colored people 
Longshoremen 
M'tgors [Mortgagors] and other Debtors 
R.R. Employees 
Pacifists 
Traitors 
Japs 
Women 
Children 
Most Men3 
Frankfurter wrote only partly in jest. Frank Murphy epito-
mized for him the judge who decided cases with his heart, not his 
head, the judge who allowed his feelings of right and wrong to de-
termine his vote without regard to something called "the rule of 
law," the judge who placed results above process. He was, in brief, 
the New Deal's version of James McReynolds. This perspective on 
Murphy, shaped by Frankfurter and his academic disciples, who 
espoused judicial restraint, "neutral principles," and other slogans 
intended to muffle the voices of judges in the nation's important 
policy debates, remained the orthodox one until the publication of 
J. Woodford Howard's judicial biography,4 which appeared in 1968 
at the end of Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice. The constitu-
tional revolution led by Warren and his brethren made judicial ac-
tivism respectable again and encouraged a reassessment of those 
I. Professor of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
2. Professor of History, University of California, San Diego. 
3. S. FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 259 (1984). 
4. ]. HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY (1968). 
463 
464 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:463 
earlier practitioners such as Murphy, who had prepared the soil for 
the jurisprudence of the Warren era. 
In his superb study of Warren published several years ago,s G. 
Edward White suggested that the former Chief Justice stood alone 
among twentieth-century members of the Supreme Court in his 
"own reconstruction of the ethical structure of the Constitution."6 
Warren, according to White, looked upon the nation's fundamental 
law as more than a framework of procedural rules allocating rights 
and powers. The Constitution rested upon certain ethical ideals 
that gave meaning to its language and which served as the founda-
tion of American society as well-respect for the individual, fair-
ness, decency, compassion. When deciding particular cases, he 
believed, the judge was obliged to "search for the 'Law beyond the 
Law,' to discern right from wrong 'in the midst of a great confu-
sion,' and to discover the ethical path."' Frank Murphy would 
have endorsed with enthusiasm this conception of the judicial role. 
During his brief tenure on the Court, which lasted from 1940 until 
1949, an era marked by World War II and the beginnings of the 
Cold War, he alone among the Justices remained, as Osmond K. 
Fraenkel noted, "a consistent upholder of liberty."s 
Murphy, who had served as Governor of Michigan during the 
sit-down strikes in the automobile industry and as Roosevelt's At-
torney General, came to the Court at an important turning point in 
its history. In the wake of the "constitutional revolution" of 1937, 
the trauma of the Court-packing battle, and the appointment of 
four new Justices by Franklin Roosevelt, the Court groped for a 
new philosophy and a new institutional role. Judicial activism, 
equated with the notorious substantive due process of the Lochner-
Adkins era, had been discredited. Few areas of economic and social 
life seemed beyond the reach of governmental controls following 
opinions such as Parrish,9 Jones & Laughlin,to and Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis.t• 
The leading figures on the chastened Court-Hugo Black, Fe-
lix Frankfurter, and Harlan Stone-all espoused some form of judi-
cial restraint which affirmed that the Justices had no special powers 
of constitutional exegesis and should therefore humble themselves 
before the majoritarian sentiments manifested in the decisions of 
5. G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE (1982). 
6. Jd. at 359. 
7. Jd. at 225. 
8. S. FINE, supra note 3, at 404. 
9. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
10. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. l (1937). 
ll. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
1985] BOOK REVIEWS 465 
Congress, the President, and the administrative bureaucracy. Black 
looked to the text of the Constitution, especially to the Bill of 
Rights, as the source of judicial limitation; Frankfurter, skeptical of 
this textual fundamentalism, argued that the limits flowed from his-
tory, precedent, and self-generated institutional prudence; Stone 
sought a formula that would restrict judicial intervention into the 
sphere of economic policy, but encourage it with respect to civil 
rights and liberties.12 
Contradictions abounded. The fundamentalist Black, who 
would not tolerate governmental encroachments upon political 
speech, the press, or the free exercise of religion, did not read the 
first amendment's establishment clause in such an absolute fashion. 
Nor did he place the fourth amendment upon the same plane of 
constitutional respect as the first. Frankfurter, the apostle of judi-
cial restraint and constitutional relativism, became an absolutist 
with respect to both the establishment clause and the fourth amend-
ment. Stone, who advocated that the Justices show a tender regard 
for "discrete and insular minorities," did not extend such judicial 
protection to leaders of the Communist Party or Japanese-
Americans. 
Frank Murphy displayed far greater consistency in his juris-
prudence than Black, Frankfurter, or Stone. He believed that the 
Constitution had been intended to protect personal liberty and that 
the Justices had a special obligation to defend freedom at a time 
when, because of economic calamity and war, the coercive powers 
of government had grown dangerously large. For Murphy, freedom 
also meant more than the absence of physical restraint by govern-
ment. It presupposed an environment of economic security and op-
portunity that made it possible for ordinary citizens to have greater 
choice about their lives. Unlike Frankfurter, for instance, he saw 
nothing contradictory in the Justices affirming broad governmental 
powers with respect to workmen's compensation or fair labor stan-
dards, but curbing governmental powers over speech, press, and 
political association. From his perspective, both sanctioned greater 
personal freedom, the ultimate constitutional value. 
With the exception of cases such as Thornhill v. Alabamai3 and 
Schneiderman v. United States, 14 Murphy seldom had the opportu-
nity to express his jurisprudence as the view of the Court. More 
frequently, he found himself compelled to write concurring opinions 
12. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
13. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
14. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). 
466 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:463 
or dissents. And what a record of dissent he compiled. Had Mur-
phy's views prevailed, the Supreme Court would have: 
-Overruled Olmstead v. United States,Is and placed 
sharp restraints upon wire-tapping and electronic surveil-
lance by the federal government in the 1940's rather than the 
1960's. 
-Declared invalid the military's expulsion of the Japa-
nese-Americans from the West Coast. 
-Overruled Caminetti v. United States, 16 which had 
turned the Mann Act into an engine of government repres-
sion far beyond the white slave traffic. 
-Prevented the executions of Japanese Generals 
Yamashita and Homma, who had been condemned by 
vengeful, drumhead military tribunals. 
-Granted conscientious objectors a decent measure of 
due process before they were inducted into the armed serv-
ices and subjected to criminal prosecution. 
-Prevented Louisiana from electrocuting Willie Fran-
cis after the first attempt failed. 
-Placed clear restraints upon the witch-hunting activi-
ties of the House Un-American Activities Committee. 
-Declared "separate-but-equal" unconstitutional in 
the late 1940's. 
"The dominant lesson of our history," wrote John P. Frank, 
"is that the courts love liberty most when it is under pressure 
least."I7 Mr. Justice Murphy was a notable exception. 
In this, the third and concluding volume of his biography of 
Murphy, Sidney Fine reconstructs an absorbing portrait of judicial 
behavior on the nation's highest court during the Second World 
War and the early days of the Cold War. Fine has tapped a rich 
lode of manuscript materials, including the judicial papers of Mur-
phy, William 0. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Wiley Rutledge, Hugo 
Black, Robert Jackson, and Harlan Stone. Thanks to this volume 
and the earlier work of Alpheus T. Mason,Is we probably know 
more about this particular epoch in the Court's life than about any 
other. We can speak with confidence about why certain issues were 
resolved the way they were, about the give-and-take process of opin-
ion writing, and about personal relationships among the Justices. 
15. Olmstead v. United States, 276 U.S. 609 (1928). 
16. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
17. Quoted inS. FINE, supra note 3, at 465. 
18. A. MAsoN, HARLAN STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956). 
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Much that Fine tells us about Murphy and his brethren adds a 
few brush strokes to an old canvas. We witness the decline of Felix 
Frankfurter's influence after the notorious decision in the first flag 
salute case,I9 and the slow rise of Hugo Black's with regard toques-
tions of the first amendment and criminal justice in the states. In 
painful detail, Fine recounts the growing bitterness between the 
Black-Douglas-Murphy faction and the one led by Frankfurter and 
Jackson, a conflict rooted in jurisprudential differences as well as 
personal vanity and egotism. The rancor among Roosevelt's Jus-
tices (Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, and 
Rutledge) made that of the "old" anti-New Deal Justices seem mild 
by comparison. 
The main surprises in the volume concern Justices Douglas 
and Jackson. The former emerges as a clever opportunist (a view 
long sponsored by Frankfurter) who always kept one judicial eye 
trained on his future political career. The latter is found to be per-
haps the most reactionary member of the Court with respect to the 
question of racial segregation. 
On three notable occasions discussed in depth by Fine, Justice 
Douglas attempted to straddle issues in an effort to appease both the 
political Left and Right. In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co. ,2o 
the Justices enforced a series of World War I contracts made be-
tween the federal government and the steelmaker despite allegations 
that the agreements, which yielded the company extraordinary 
profits, had been made under "duress" and were "unconscionable" 
as a matter of law. Douglas voted in the majority to enforce the 
agreements, but he also filed a last-minute concurrence which ar-
gued that the agreements had contained an implied promise Bethle-
hem would achieve certain production efficiencies before reaping 
the profits. Without convincing evidence on this point, they could 
not collect the extraordinary profits. But because the lower courts 
had resolved this point the other way, Douglas argued, he felt 
bound by their decision. Douglas's concurrence outraged Murphy, 
who had earlier rejected that analysis of the contracts, although he, 
too, believed the profits to be excessive. "The Bethlehem case," he 
told Frankfurter, "first put me wise to Bill Douglas."21 
A year later, when a narrow majority on the Court overturned 
the government's effort to strip Communist Party leader William 
Schneiderman of his citizenship and deport him,22 Douglas again 
19. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
20. 315 u.s. 289 (1942). 
21. Quoted in S. FINE, supra note 3, at 346-50. 
22. Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118 (1943). 
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sought to straddle a controversial question. He filed another con-
curring opinion which agreed that the prosecution had failed to es-
tablish fraud in the case, but also noted that Congress could 
prohibit the naturalization of Communists if it desired to do so. 
Murphy again expressed to Frankfurter his shock at Douglas's 
"skulduggery" in seeking to appease the nation's anti-Communist 
sentiments while at the same time blocking the Schneiderman 
deportation.23 
Finally, in the infamous Screws case,24 Douglas wrote an opin-
ion which sustained the constitutionality of key provisions in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1870, but reversed the conviction of the immedi-
ate defendant, a Georgia sheriff, who had beaten to death his Negro 
prisoner. Douglas's opinion relied on the argument that the judge 
had failed to instruct the jury that Claude Screws could be con-
victed only if the prosecution proved that he intended to "willfully" 
deprive his prisoner of a right protected by the Constitution. Mur-
phy wrote a scathing dissent which noted that "knowledge of a 
comprehensive law library is unnecessary for officers of the law to 
know that the right to murder individuals in the course of their 
duties is unrecognized in this nation. "2s In his judgment, Douglas 
was once again attempting to mollify two important constituencies 
for his political future-the liberal, civil rights wing of the Demo-
cratic Party as well as the lily-white, segregationist bloc in the 
South. 
Murphy was prepared as early as the 1948 Sipue/ case26 to de-
clare "separate-but-equal" educational facilities unconstitutional. 
But not Justice Jackson, who voted against granting certiorari in 
the case and admonished his brethren that "every discussion of 
(the] race problem makes it worse."21 Jackson also voted to deny 
certiorari in the landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer 2s with the 
blunt observation: "I would deny and you'll wish you had."29 
Gossip columnists and reporters poked fun at Murphy's sexual 
peccadillos and at his juvenile efforts to participate in the war effort 
by taking basic military training. Much to the chagrin of Chief Jus-
tice Stone, he insisted on wearing a military uniform to the Court 
when the Justices met in Special Term to hear the pleas of the Nazi 
saboteurs. His colleagues on the bench mocked his intelligence and 
23. S. FINE, supra note 3, at 414-15. 
24. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
25. S. FINE, supra note 3, at 400-01. 
26. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
27. S. FINE, supra note 3, at 563. 
28. 334 u.s. 1 (1948). 
29. S. FINE, supra note 3, at 565. 
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his religion behind his back. When Henry Wallace asked Harlan 
Stone in 1943 if Murphy had "grown" in his job, Stone replied "He 
can no more grow than that stone."Jo Justice Roberts and Judge 
Learned Hand referred to him as "the Saint," "St. Francis," or 
"Jesus, Lover of My Soul."JI But the Murphy who emerges in this 
fine biography was a Justice of unusual courage. He took seriously 
his oath to defend the Constitution and did a better job in that re-
spect than any of his colleagues. He was not among those Justice 
Jackson had in mind when he penned the following ditty in 1941: 
Come you back to Mandalay 
And hear what the judges say 
As they talk as brave as thunder 
And then run the other way.32 
ON COURTS AND DEMOCRACY: SELECTED NON-
JUDICIAL WRITINGS OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT. Edited 
by Arthur Selwyn Miller.I Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press. 1984. Pp. xvi, 291. $29.95. 
A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL OD-
YSSEY OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT. By Arthur Selwyn 
Miller. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1984. Pp. xiv, 
242. $29.95. 
Ernest van den Haag 2 
In Arthur Selwyn Miller, Judge J. Skelly Wright found an 
ideal biographer, who shares his understanding, or, I would con-
tend, misunderstanding, of the nature of law and of the role of 
judges. In turn Professor Miller has found an ideal person to write 
the foreword in Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., with whom he shares 
not only a misunderstanding of the function of law, but also a re-
markable inability to command the English language. A few in-
30. /d. at 249. 
31. /d. at 262, 266. 
32. /d. at 263. 
I. Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University; Adjunct Professor of 
Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. 
2. John M. Olin Professor of Jurisprudence and Public Policy, Fordham University. 
